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REMARKS
THE RELIGION OF THE JUSTICE: DOES IT AFFECT
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING?

John T. Noonan, Jr.*
"[N]o religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public
trust under the United States."1 Here, in the body of the Constitution, antedating the
First Amendment, is the first commitment of our country to religious freedom in the
sense of the eligibility of every citizen, whatever his or her religion, to be appointed to
federal office. At a time when religious tests were still employed by states such as
Massachusetts and New Hampshire to limit state office to Protestants, this provision was
a bold and sweeping challenge to religious bigotry. In its light, should we ever be
concerned about the religion of a judge?
Human nature being what it is, there cannot help being some inquiry as to the
impact of religion on a judge's decisions. To some persons it may seem particularly
relevant when, for the first time in the nation's history, five members of the Supreme
Court of the United States are Catholics. On this sensitive subject, speculation, I believe,
is neither appropriate nor useful. To answer the question in my title, I shall resort to
history and to my own experience.
Twenty-five years ago I wrote a paper on the five Justices of the United States
Supreme Court who had identified themselves as Catholics and who, as they were no
longer alive, I could comfortably discuss. They were, in chronological order, Roger
Taney, Chief Justice from 1836 to 1864; Edward Douglass White, Justice from 1894 to
1910, Chief Justice from 1910 to 1921; Joseph McKenna, Justice from 1898 to 1925;
Pierce Butler, Justice from 1922 to 1939; and Frank Murphy, Justice from 1940 to 1949.
I asked if their membership in the Catholic Church had had any discernible impact on
3
their judicial decisions.
* United States Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. LL.B. Harvard Law School;
Ph.D. Catholic University of America; M.A. Catholic University of America; B.A. Harvard College. This
article was adapted from remarks given at the Constitutional Day Lecture, University of Tulsa College of Law,
Tulsa, Oklahoma, on September 20, 2006.
1. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 3.
2. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Catholic Justices ofthe United States Supreme Court, 67 Cath. Historical Rev.
369 (1981).
3. Id at 371 Sherman Minton, an Associate Justice from 1949 to 1956, became a Catholic in 1961. Id at
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Taney, of course, was a slaveholder from Maryland, most famous in history for his
opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford.4 I did not see that his religion prompted his decision,
although it did not discourage it. The Jesuits had been slave owners in Maryland until
1838. 5 But even Justice Curtis, who resigned in disgust at the decision, 6 did not suggest
that it had religious roots. As far as I could see, Taney's work was what might have been
expected of a Jacksonian Democrat. In a very different case, Taney exhibited an unusual
delicacy in conscience in refusing to adjudicate the constitutionality of a federal income
tax that reduced the effective compensation of federal judges. 7 I would not ascribe this
recusal to his religion, either.
White, a former Confederate officer, was appointed by Grover Cleveland, who,
according to a probable story, was impressed by his Mass-going on a Sunday. 8 He was
made Chief Justice by a Republican president, Taft, reaching out to Catholic voters. 9 In
White's day there was a Protestant-Catholic consensus on moral values, especially as to
sex, with a division on divorce. As a Justice, White wrote a notable opinion on divorce,
Haddock v. Haddock.10 The official Catholic position was that the state had no power to
dissolve a marriage. I I Therefore a Catholic judge could not participate in a divorce.
Haddock held that a husband could not move from New York to Connecticut and sue his
wife, still resident in New York, for divorce in his new state. 12 White accepted state
jurisdiction over divorce 13 at the same time he discouraged divorce in a jurisdiction that
made it easier. 14 His opinion did not follow a narrow Catholic line.
McKenna, a congressional buddy of McKinley who appointed him, was the least
distinguished of the five but wrote one great opinion, Weems v. United States, 15 holding
that cruel and unusual punishment was not to be determined by eighteenth-century
precedent but by evolving standards of human decency. 16 It is tempting to attribute this
insight to a conscience enlightened by religion, but Justice White (as well as that other
17
old soldier Justice Holmes) dissented.
Justice Holmes was the one with whom Pierce Butler disagreed in the case of the
forced sterilization of Carrie Buck in Buck v. Bell. 18 "Three generations of imbeciles are

370 n. 1. 1do not include him in the survey.
4. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
5. John T. Noonan, Jr., A Church That Can and Cannot Change: The Development of Catholic Moral
Teaching 106 (U. Notre Dame Press 2005).
6. Stuart Streichler, Justice Curtis in the Civil War Era: At the CrossroadsofAmerican Constitutionalism
145 (U. Va. Press 2005).
7. Noonan, supra n. 2, at 381.
8. Id. at 373.
9. Walter F. Pratt, Jr., The Supreme Court under Edward Douglass White, 1910-1921 19 (U. S.C. Press
1999).
10. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
11. Noonan, supra n. 2, at 377.
12. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 574.
13. Id. at 573.
14. Id.at 574.
15. 217 U.S. 349(1910).
16. Id. at 380-81.
17. Id.at 382-413 (White & Holmes, JJ., dissenting).
18. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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enough,"' 19 Holmes famously pronounced and privately noted "the religious are astir.
But Justice Butler dissented without opinion, 2 1 so no expression of his views, religious
or otherwise, was recorded.
Frank Murphy, attorney general under Roosevelt, was the President's choice to
succeed Butler, as if "a Catholic seat" on the Court had to be filled. 22 As a political
figure, Murphy was the opposite of Butler, who was a former corporate lawyer. Often
joining the old Ku Klux Klanner, Hugo Black, Murphy did disagree with him in one
notable instance: the Japanese internment case, Korematsu v. UnitedStates,2 3 describing
the result of the majority opinion as a "legalization of racism. ' 24 Again, it is tempting to
ascribe this conscientious position to a religious conscience, but evidence is lacking.
Since I wrote of these five men, a sixth Catholic Justice, William Brennan, has
died. I knew him slightly and several of his clerks better. One federal judge I knew who
knew him did not regard him as a Catholic, but I always accepted him as he presented
himself, accepting from the University of Notre Dame in 1969 the Laetare Medal
awarded to an outstanding American Catholic. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,25 in striking down
the Massachusetts law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives, 2 6 he invalidated a
law passed under Protestant auspices in 187927 and vigorously championed by Cardinal
O'Connell in the 1940s. 2 8 But it was a law no longer supported by Cardinal Cushing,
O'Connell's successor, in 1961.29 So the decision itself did not depart from evolving
Catholic doctrine.
Brennan's language in Eisenstadt on reproductive freedom was subsequently the
foundation of Roe v. Wade,3° in which he joined. I have not understood how a Catholic
or any judge who was guided by the terms of the Constitution could conscientiously do
so. But obviously Catholic consciences differ. Brennan in Roe showed that they can
differ on abortion. It is not, I think, the business of anyone to judge the conscience of
another.
I turn to Catholic Justices who are alive, whom I do know in varying degrees, and
who have participated in decisions of the Supreme Court where religion could have
played a part. In the abortion cases, precedent introduced a value not present in Roe v.
Wade; otherwise, Justice Kennedy's position in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey3 1 is as
unexplained in religious terms as Justice Brennan's. As for the two Catholic dissenters,

19. Id.at 207.
20. Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondenceof Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski, 1916-1935 938
(Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harv. U. Press 1953).
21. Buck, 274 U.S. at 208 (Butler, J., dissenting).
22. Noonan, supra n. 2, at 382.
23. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
24. Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
25. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
26. Id. at 443.
27 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 21 (West 2000) (repealed 2004).
28. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of Religious Freedom 20
(U. Cal. Press 1998).
29. J. Leon Hooper, The Ethics of Discourse: The Social Philosophy of John Courtney Murray 90-91 (Geo.
U. Press 1986).
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Justices Scalia and Thomas, strict adherence to the meaning of the Constitution would
account for their votes as readily as their religion. Their fellow dissenters, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice White, were not influenced by Catholic beliefs.
On school prayer, Justice Kennedy has been a purist in rejecting it32 Justices Scalia
and Thomas accommodationists in allowing it. 33 On financial aid to individuals
attending religious schools, all three have been accommodating. 34 On neutral laws that
impact religious practice without targeting it, all three have upheld legislation with
negative impact on a church or religious practice. 35 They have even gone further by
declaring unconstitutional the attempt of Congress to remedy their work by the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. 36 It is hard to fit these patterns of voting into profiles of
Catholics voting to advance their beliefs.
On an issue with no overt religious implications, I would like to think that a
Catholic conscience is reflected in Justice Kennedy following Justice McKenna in
37
insisting that gross disproportionality in sentencing is cruel and unusual punishment.
But Justice Scalia's view that proportionality cannot be determined 38 is a counter to this
speculation. More generally, in the course of 170 years of Catholics on the Supreme
Court, it does not appear that the identification of a Justice as a Catholic carries with it
predictive value as to his vote. I abstain from speculation about the new Catholic
Justices, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito.
I have picked the Catholic Justices to examine, partly because they constitute a
small, compact group and partly because I know more of their formal beliefs than those
of another group. I have, however, little doubt that similar conclusions could be drawn
by looking at the even smaller group of Jewish Justices: Louis Brandeis, Benjamin
Cardozo, Felix Frankfurter, Arthur Goldberg, Abe Fortas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
Stephen Breyer. None, I believe, could be counted as Orthodox. All share a Jewish
heritage. I doubt that one could find a single tenet of Judaism that played a decisive part
in their decisions. As individuals, who could have been more different in their approach
to judging than Brandeis and Fortas or than Cardozo and Frankfurter? In passing, I note
that no Catholic could have written an opinion more respectful to canon law than Justice
Brandeis in Gonzalez v. Roman CatholicArchbishop of Manila.3 9
I assume that the same variety of approaches would be found among the vast
majority of Justices who were Protestants, with Episcopalians making up almost onethird and Presbyterians over one-sixth.
No one has suggested that there is an
Episcopalian or Presbyterian color to any Court's decision. Is that because there has
been less American prejudice against these denominations than against Catholics or
Jews? Or is it because the moral doctrines of these denominations are thought to be less

32. E.g. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
33. Id at 631 (Rehnquist, C.J & Scalia, White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
34. E.g Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist, 509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993).
35. City ofBoerne v Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
36. Id.at 511.
37. Harmelin v. Mich., 501 U S. 957, 996-98 (1991) (Kennedy, O'Connor & Souter, JJ., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
38. Id. at 994 (plurality).
39. 280 U.S. I (1929).
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rigid than the Catholics'? I suggest that if Catholic or Jewish Justices had been as
numerous as Episcopalian Justices, the idea that the Catholic's religion predicted his vote
would have died long ago.
No doubt there are or have been Justices who associated themselves with no
religious tradition. Justice Douglas comes to mind as an example. Only Justice Holmes
openly made a point of his religious skepticism.
I see his traumatic experiences in the
Civil War as having far greater impact on his decisions than his religious opinion.
I supplement my reading of history by my experience as a judge who is a believing
Catholic and is sworn to uphold the Constitution of the United States. First, as to
abortion. Early in my life on the circuit, I was asked to deal with the case of an
employee of the California Health Department, who, without the department's
permission, had appeared before the California legislature to oppose a bill restricting
abortion. 4 1 She had been disciplined for this action and sued the department, claiming
that her constitutional freedom of speech and freedom to petition had been violated.4 2 I
wrote the unanimous opinion upholding her contentions. 4 3 I had no doubt that what she
advocated should not influence our decision in the case.
Later I sat on a case from Everett, Washington, where an abortion clinic had
brought a RICO action against anti-abortion picketers of the clinic.4 4 Neither I nor my
two colleagues, Judges Hug and Thompson, thought that a Catholic was disqualified
from hearing the case. We all agreed in an opinion by Judge Hug, vacating on res
judicata grounds a judgment in favor of the clinic.4 5 Belatedly, after we had heard
argument and reached our decision but before it was published, the clinic formally
moved for my recusal. 46 In a published opinion I denied the motion and explained my
47
conclusion.
To my mind, the decisive precedent was offered by Thurgood Marshall. Before
being a judge, Marshall had been very active in the cause of racial justice, in particular as
counsel for the NAACP. Marshall on that account did not recuse himself in cases where
justice to African Americans was an issue. It would have been absurd for him to do so.
He had been appointed because he understood these issues. I concluded that an
American judge was not expected to come to a court without commitments on the great
public issues of his day and that on abortion, in particular, neither a pro-abortion or antiabortion history constituted disqualifying bias if one could judge the case before one
fairly. 48 The appearance of bias that one's history suggested could not be a factor if
American judges were to come, as they did come, out of a highly political process. I
added, for good measure, that Orthodox Judaism, the Mormon Church, and many

40. Albert W. Alschuler, Law without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy of Justice Holmes 25 (U. Chi.
Press 2000).
41. Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594, 595 (9th Cir. 1988).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 597.
44. Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti,63 F.3d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 1995).
45. Id at 866
46. Feminist Women's Health Ctr v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399, 400 (9th Cir. 1995).
47. Id. at 400-01.
48. Id. at 400.
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Protestant denominations viewed abortion as sinful.4 9 Were only approvers of abortion
fit to judge the case of an abortion provider? I did not think that judicial impartiality
required so much. If every judge who was pro- or anti-abortion were disqualified from
deciding an abortion case, the judiciary would be crippled. The same holds true as to
every great issue on which public opinion is divided and on which every politically
conscious person has convictions, often formed or aided by his religious commitments.
To make those commitments a test for holding judicial office would violate, or come
dangerously close to violating, Article VI of the Constitution and its ban on religious
tests.
At the other end of life was a case from Washington challenging the statute
criminalizing assistance to suicide. 50 At the suit of several physicians, the district court
held the statute an unconstitutional invasion of a private zone of personal autonomy. 5 1 I
thought the matter a straightforward application of constitutional principle. My own
religious scruples about suicide were not relevant. No litigant suggested that they were.
I wrote the two-to-one opinion of the panel reversing the district court. 52 The circuit, en
banc, eight to three, promptly reversed me, 53 only to be in turn reversed by the Supreme
Court, nine to zero. 54 In retrospect, I read this unanimous agreement with my decision
as strong evidence that not religion but fidelity to the Constitution and judicial precedent
provided proper guidance in deciding the case.
A different kind of end-of-life question is posed by the death penalty. My
colleague Alex Kozinski has written an elegant article for The New Yorker entitled
Tinkering with Death,5 5 but I have not had a case requiring me to impose death. I have
sat only on cases where a state court has imposed death and the federal court has been
asked if the federal Constitution was violated in the process. We have had power only to
correct an error of federal constitutional significance. True, if we found no such error,
the petitioner would be executed. The lay public might read our opinion as blessing the
execution. I did not think that such a misreading of our function was a reason for seeing
myself as a cooperator in the state's taking of life.
It is true that on the moral legitimacy of the death penalty Catholic teaching has
changed. Once accepting it as a necessary prerogative of government, the Catholic
Church under Pope John Paul II has taught that death can only be imposed in rare
circumstances and not at all if the defendant can be securely imprisoned. 56 There is a
certain hesitancy in the teaching, whose logic leads to the conclusion that a statesponsored execution is state-sponsored homicide; the pope and bishops do not denounce
the government as guilty of murder but only plead for clemency. The doctrinal
development is not complete. Yet I am glad never to have had to face a case where my

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Compassion in Dying v. Wash, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 589.
Id. at 588.
Compassion in Dying v. Wash., 79 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane).
Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 709 (1997).
Alex Kozinski, Tinkering With Death, 72 New Yorker 48 (Feb. 10, 1997).
Pope John Paul 11, Evangelium vitae § 56 (Mar. 25, 1995) (available at http-//www.vatican.va/

edocs/ENG0141/_PP.HTM).
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vote would have confirmed the death sentence.
Justice Scalia, who seems reluctant to recognize the doctrinal change, has written
that if it has really occurred, all Catholic judges should resign as incapable of carrying
out the law. 5 7 I read that statement as a rhetorical move. A federal judge rarely is asked
to impose or to uphold a sentence of death. If the judge is conscientiously convinced that
any taking of human life cannot be justified, it is, I believe, his duty to disqualify himself
if the law requires imposition of death. I do not think that a rare recusal carries with it a
declaration of incompetence to function as a judge ninety-nine percent of the time.
I turn to an even rarer case, the case of the confession bugged in the county jail of
Eugene, Oregon. 58 Having arrested Conan Hale, the probable murderer of three
teenagers, his jailers decided to tape his confession to a Catholic priest. The tape was
turned over to the district attorney, who proposed to introduce it at Hale's trial. Oregon
by statute protected priest-penitent communications from forced disclosure but said
nothing about recording. Word of the taping leaked out. The priest and Archbishop
George of Portland asked the state court to suppress it; the court firmly informed them
that they had no standing to intervene. 59 They sought relief in the federal district court,
which held itself constrained by precedent not to interfere with an ongoing state
prosecution. 60 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit I heard the case together with David
61
Thompson and Andrew Kleinfeld.
Our combined research disclosed no case where a sacramental confession had been
admitted as evidence in a criminal trial. 62 Where it had been attempted in 1813 in New
York City, Mayor DeWitt Clinton, presiding as Recorder, held that such an interference
63
with Catholic practice would violate the freedom of religion enjoyed by all Americans.
By statute or by court decision, the sanctity of confession had, ever since, been
preserved.
I was conscious that, as a Catholic, I was sensitive to the prosecutorial invasion.
However, I also saw that my two colleagues, one Protestant and one Jewish, were
equally taken aback and that Mayor Clinton and all the states that protected the secrecy
of confession were not doing so in deference to Catholic teaching but out of respect for a
religious rite of significance to one portion of the public. I did take note that Conan
Hale, a baptized Christian, was canonically eligible to receive the sacrament, though not
a Catholic. 64 I also observed that in the federal district court Hale had disclosed the
substance of his confession: "I made confession and asked for God to forgive me for...
being angry with the District Attorney for believing Susbauer instead of me." 6 5 Hale
had waived the penitent's privilege and, incidentally, revealed that the whole business
was a ruse setting up the district attorney. But the priest had not waived his justified

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, First Things 17, 21 (May 2002).
Mockaitis v. Harcleroad,104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id at 1526.
Mockaitts v. Harcelroad,938 F. Supp. 1516, 1520 (D. Or. 1996).
Mockaitis, 104 F.3d 1522.
Id at 1533.
Id at1532.
Id. at1525.
Id. at1527.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2006

7

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 42 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 11
TULSA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 42:761

expectation of privacy, so the bugging had violated the Fourth Amendment as an
unreasonable search. 66 A second string to our bow was the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, still of constitutional validity at the time of our decision. 67 The state
did not seek review nor did it challenge my impartiality. No judge of the Ninth Circuit
questioned my opinion. I have no doubt that the result we reached would have been the
same if any other member of our court had sat in my place.
One might conclude from my review of my own experience as well as from the
history of Catholic Justices of the United States Supreme Court that religion is
sometimes relevant as one strand in a judge's mind. Religion, however, does not
regularly predict how a judge will vote on a constitutional question. It does not furnish
an explanation of how the judge voted. It does not regularly distinguish the judge from
colleagues who do not share his religious beliefs. That conclusion seems true as to the
Justices whose opinions I have examined and true of my own experience. At the same
time, this way of measuring the impact of belief on a judge's action seems to me crude
and blundering.
One reason is that the major religions are complex compositions, containing a
variety of commandments understood in terms of tradition and theological interpretation.
You cannot isolate a single, simple precept and assume that it will determine a judge's
behavior. Let me give three illustrations.
In the Gospels, Jesus tells his followers, "Judge not, that ye be not judged." 68 The
command is clear and apparently comprehensive. If it were taken literally, no Christian
would be a judge. So far as I can determine, no major Christian denomination has ever
taken these words as a prohibition of the profession of judging. The command has been
qualified and treated as irrelevant to professional judges.
My next two examples are of fundamental texts. The Ten Commandments, set out
in Exodus and repeated in Deuteronomy, are often seen as a succinct summary of basic
moral duties and are sometimes proposed as appropriate for public buildings. Two of the
commandments contain an implicit acceptance of human slavery as an institution-the
commandment on keeping the Sabbath, which includes a specific provision for rest by
the slaves, 69 and the commandment against covetousness, where the objects not to be
coveted include your neighbor's slave and slave girl.
No one today argues from these
texts that slavery is approved by God. No judge would use these sections of the
commandments in interpreting American law outlawing slavery. The tremendous
change in attitude and culture that began slowly about 1690 and culminated in the Civil
War has made biblical argument in favor of slavery obsolete and unthinkable.
As a third example, "love thy neighbor as thyself' is put forward by Jesus in the
Gospels as central to his teaching. 7 1 Could any judge say that he loves a defendant as
himself when he sentences the defendant to death or to prolonged incarceration? It is

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Mockaitts, 104 F.3d at 1533.
Id at 1528-31.
Matthew 7:1 (King James); Luke 6:37 (King James).
Exodus 20:10 (King James); Deuteronomy 5:14 (King James).
Exodus 20:17 (King James); Deuteronomy 5:21 (King James).
Mark 12:31 (King James).
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evident, I think, that Christian judges understand their professional role to qualify the
fundamental Christian command. Tradition has modified its radical force.
There is a second and larger reason than the complexity of religion as to why one
cannot go directly from a judge's religion to his judicial behavior. What enters into a
judge's judgment is the judge's experience of life. It is not the party of the president
who appointed him---a peculiarly gross way of predicting or accounting for the judge's
acts, although a way often mechanically adopted by journalists. It is not solely the
judge's prior experience as a litigator, a prosecutor, a bureaucrat, a corporate counselor, a
civil rights activist, or a law teacher, although any one of such careers will have
contributed to the judge's thinking. It is not solely the judge's childhood or his relations
with his parents or his relationship to his spouse or to his children, if he has any. All of
these relationships help mold the mind, the sensibility, the capacity for empathy that
affect judgment. Education at every level from kindergarten to law school makes a
difference too, in the best way by enabling the judge to make distinctions, see
implications, and comprehend complexities and depth. In short, myriad are the
influences that have gone into making the judge the person the judge is. The small
segment of experience constituted by religious belief must mesh with the rest of the
myriad. It was once written in praise of Henry James that he "had too fine a mind to
have an idea"72--that is, James could not be read as writing from anything but an
empathetic identification with the characters he cherished as persons. So, too, a judge
should be seen as responding to the persons in the case before him, bringing not ideology
but the response of a person to a person within the context cast by law. That response
should be shaped by conscience.
Judges, especially appellate judges, suffer little supervision. If they procrastinate
in deciding a difficult case, nothing happens to them. If they let a law clerk not only
write the opinion but master all the facts of a case in their stead, no reproach will reach
them. If they pursue a policy rigidly, regardless of the persons before them, no one will
point out their preference for abstractions. Their only effective supervisor is their
conscience, reminding them that what they do has an impact on the lives of other human
beings.
Every person, I venture to affirm, has a conscience. A judge is no exception.
Whether that conscience is formed by formal religion or parental exhortation or the
lessons of life, or all such influences, the judge will respond to the persons before him
guided by this inner guide. To act against it, as a judge is capable of doing, is to make
oneself an unhappy person. The better that it is integrated with the judge's beliefs the
surer and finer will be his judgment. To invoke a person of great experience in public
life, Winston Churchill said, in tribute to Neville Chamberlain, "[t]he only guide to a
sincerity of his
man is his conscience; the only shield to his memory is the rectitude and
73
actions. It is very imprudent to walk through life without this shield."
Conscience, of course, is a theological concept. It appears not by name but by

72. F.W. Dupree, Henry James 23 (William Sloane Assocs. 1951).
73. Winston S. Churchill, Speech, Neville Chamberlain (House of Commons, Nov. 12, 1940) (available at
www winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfmpageid=42 1).
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functional equivalent in the Hebrew Bible. It appears in Christian theology as the way
God communicates to a human being. It has become a secular term in modem America,
even appearing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where Rule 1974instructs courts to
decide the indispensability of a party "in equity and good conscience."
Frankly, I find it difficult to understand the trust put in conscience when its
theological roots are cut. (I do not doubt the sincerity of the conscientious atheist-only
his explanation for his certainty.) But as long as there is a consensus that conscience is
key, I will no more quarrel with another's understanding of its power than I would judge
the conscience of another. From my perspective, it is this conviction at one's inner core,
uniting principles and experience and empathy, that counts most in judging. It is here
that the religion of the judge-not just this or that particular precept but the whole thrust
of the judge's commitment to God-can make a difference. To measure that difference,
however, belongs not to any human but to God.

74. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.
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